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THOROUGHBRED HORSE RACING:
WHY A UNIFORM APPROACH TO DRUG REGULATION
IS NECESSARY

Cody M Conner*
INTRODUCTION

In May 2008, a crowd anxiously witnessed the aftermath of
Eight Belle's narrow defeat in the Kentucky Derby.' Whereupon
crossing the finish line, Eight Belles collapsed on two broken legs
and was subsequently euthanized in front of a captivated
2
audience-both present and at home. As the world tried to
understand this tragedy, the trainer of the Kentucky Derby
winner, a horse named Big Brown, made a shocking admission: he
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&

had administered performance enhancing steroids to Big Brown
prior to the race.3 After this startling admission, the horse racing
community fell into a frenzy, stoking the debate around steroid
4
regulation for horse racing commissions across the United States.
This debate has driven the commissions to request Congress to
adopt uniform rules regulating drug usage in thoroughbred race
horses. This request, however, has largely proven ineffective.
Legislative oversight of horse racing can be traced back to
the 1978 Horse Racing Act-a law providing the Federal Trade
Commission with oversight and enforcement powers to implement
5
rules and practices for the sport. Specifically, this Act regulates
"interstate commerce with respect to parimutuel wagering on
Thoroughbred horseracing in order to protect and further the
6
Thoroughbred horseracing industry of the United States."
NATURAL RESOURCES Law, 2017-2018; B.S. 2015, Austin Peay State University; J.D.
expected May 2018, University of Kentucky.
I Bradley S. Friedman, Oats, Water, Hay, andEverythingElse: The Regulation of
Anabolic Steroids in ThoroughbredHorse Racing, 16 ANIMAL L. 123, 125 (2009).
2Id.

3 Id.
4Id.

Harmonized
5 John T. Wendt, Horse Racing in the United States: A Call for a
Approach to Anti-Doping Regulation, 25 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 176, 177 (2015).
6 Horse Racing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.S. § 3001 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance
through PL 115-51, approved 8/18/17)
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Notably lacking from this legislation, however, is any rule that
regulates drug use in thoroughbred horse racing. Consequently,
there remain thirty-eight separate state racing commissions with
thirty-eight different sets of regulations.7 Although no uniform
approach has been adopted to resolve this issue, numerous
attempts have been made.8
Most recently, Representatives Andy Barr of Kentucky and
Paul Tonko of New York proposed the Thoroughbred Horseracing
Act of 2015 (THA).9 This legislation aimed to task the United
States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) with standardizing
medication regulations across the states.10 There has also been
other similar proposed legislation seeking uniformity. In fact,
while the THA was put before the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, similar legislation was
simultaneously pending before the House;"1 neither of the
proposed bills, however, made it out of committee.12
Proponents of uniform drug policies are concerned with
more than just the general welfare of horses. Joseph De Francis, a
former Maryland Jockey Club CEO and thirty-five-year industry
veteran, believes that such policies are needed to replace the
fragmented, state-by-state patchwork of regulations to provide
clarity within the sport. 13 Additionally, other advocates argue that
the decrease in followers of horse racing has reduced the sport to
an item of nostalgia.1 4 Because of this decline in followers, the
amount of gambling on horse races has also decreased, leading to
lower industry revenues.1 5
Opponents of uniform drug policies, or at least those similar
to the THA, point to the broad powers such policies attempt to vest
in organizations-particularly private organizations like the
USADA.1 6 Specifically, these opponents argue that such federal

I Wendt, supra note 6, at 177.
S1d.
9 JeffZalesin, House Bill Calls for National ThoroughbredDopingRules, LAw360
(July 16, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/680227/house-bill-calls-for-nationalthoroughbred-doping-rules.
0 Id.
" H.R. 3084; see also H.R. 2641, 114th Cong. (referred to H. Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., and Trade, June 5, 2015) (LEXIS).
12 Id.
a

_d.
15Id.

14

16 Zalesin, supra note 10.
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action would usurp states' rights and create an unneeded layer of
bureaucracy.17 Ed Martin, President of the Association of Racing
Commissioners International (ARCI), said, "The ARCI is
unanimous in its opposition to the accountability by putting it in
8
the hands of a private organization." Martin further argued that
equine welfare and medication policy should not be put in the
hands of an entity with no experience in the industry and no
9
veterinarian involvement.
Though Mr. Martin speaks for many in the industry, not all
opponents outright reject horse racing being regulated by private
authorities; rather, they only believe that the USADA, an
organization responsible for monitoring drug abuse in human
20
athletes, is not the best-equipped to do so.
Then there are those who argue that any form of federal
regulation providing uniform drug policies is wholly unnecessary.
Phil Hanrahan, CEO of the National Horsemen's Benevolent and
Protective Association, is one such individual. He insists that horse
racing is a clean sport, independent of any further federal
legislation. As evidence, he references the low amount of positive
drug test results relative to the total amount of those conducted in
the United States. Accordingly, Mr. Hanrahan rejected a bill
proposing uniform drug regulation, similar to the THA, in 2013.21
Despite these disagreements, one area of industry
consensus is that the welfare of horses must be the primary
concern of any effort to combat doping. While most agree that
doping horses is not good for the sport, there are disagreements
regarding the most suitable approach to establishing and enforcing
drug regulations. There are two approaches: (1) state-by-state
patchwork regulations (currently applied); and (2) the federal
approach. 22 Prior to adopting either approach, it is essential to
consider the industry's recent economic history.

Barker, supranote 14.
ARC] NHBPA Express Opposition to Proposed HorseracingIntegrity Act,
PAULICK REPORT (July 16, 2015, 3:53 PM), http://www.paulickreport.com/news/the-biz/arei
expresses-concern-over-proposed-horseracing-integrity- act/.
19 Id.
17

18

20Id.

Ray Paulick, HBPA: Feds Addressing Problem that Does Not Exist, PAULICK
12:57 AM), http://www.paulickreport.com/news/ray-s2013,
(Nov. 21,

21

REPORT

paddock/horse-racing-comes-to-washington-written-testimony-for-todays-hearing/.
22

Id

114

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.

[Vol. 10 No. 1

In drafting the THA of 2015, Congress made findings that
the horse
racing industry accounts for approximately
$25,000,000,000 and 38,000 jobs in the United States economy
annually. The findings further provided that "[fifty] percent of the
317,000 starts by Thoroughbred horses in 2014 were made by

horses

that

competed

in

more

than

one

State."2 3

The

aforementioned 1978 Horse Racing Act enables the federal
government to regulate the horse racing industry due to its effects
on interstate commerce. 24 Thoroughbred horse racing's impact on
the nation's economy underscores the need for uniform drug
regulation. Uniform drug regulation would help stabilize the
industry and permit it to regain the critical following that was lost
due to disillusionment by rampant doping practices.
Accordingly, this Note argues that congressional action
must be taken to achieve a uniform approach to drug regulation in
thoroughbred racing. Part I provides further background
information regarding the current, state-by-state approach to drug
regulation; an approach that permits rule exploitation by states.
The regulations currently in place in Kentucky and New York
illustrates how this approach permits exploitation. Moving to the
alternative approach, Part II briefly provides more background
information regarding the benefits of a national approach to drug
regulation and focuses upon prior efforts to do so. Next, Part III
further describes the THA of 2015, distinguishes this legislation
from past efforts, and offers an explanation as to why it, like
previous efforts, will likely fail. Part IV analyzes the arguments
against the congressional implementation of a national approach.
Last, Part V offers a simpler approach to instituting a uniform
drug policy via an amendment to the 1978 Horse Racing Act.
Specifically, the focus and conclusion will be that this approach
would not constitute an unconstitutional usurpation of states'
rights.
I. STATE-BY-STATE APPROACHES

A. Background

23
24

H.R. 3084, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
Wendt, supra note 8, at 177.
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For general purposes, the horse racing industry as a whole
is represented by the National Thoroughbred Racing Association
(NTRA).25 The NTRA is a coalition that includes "the leading
racetrack owners, trainers, affiliated racing associations, [and]
26
horse owners and breeders." The purpose of this organization is
"to serve the industry as a consensus builder around solutions to
27
problems of national importance to the horseracing industry."
The ability of this organization, however, to recommend reform is
limited and does not extend to drug regulation. Thus, drug
regulation is still left to the thirty-eight separate state racing
commissions; an arrangement that has led to the development of
28
thirty-eight different sets of regulations.
Each state commission regulates the horse racing industry,
within its state, as a member of the Association of Racing
Commissioners International (ARCI).29 While the ARCI offers
guidance with respect to national standards for the industry, the
30
states themselves regulate their individual activities. Therefore,
the current fragmented system allows each state to regulate drug
usage in horse racing how they see fit.
This fragmented system is inherently problematic. Each of
the thirty-eight state racing commissions operate in exclusion
while they actively compete against one another for a limited
31
number of horses to start at their tracks. This is because the
greater the number of horses started at a given track, the greater
the "handle," that is the amount of money wagered in the
32
parimutuels, will be at that track. Increases in handles then lead
to increases in the tax revenues generated by each individual state.
This in turn incentivizes state racing commissions to implement
lenient regulations to attract more owners, trainers, and
33
ultimately horses.

&

25 Anthony Russolello, Avoiding a Triple Frown: The Need for a NationalHorse
Racing Commission, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAw- ANIMAL LEGAL
HISTORICAL CENTER (2009).
26 Id.
27

Id.

28 Id.

29 d

30Id.
Drugs in
31 Kyle Cassidy, Reining in the Use of Performance Enhancing

Horseracing Why a FederalRegulation is Needed, 24 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 121,
128(2014).
32 d
33 Id. at 128-29.
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Put more simply, Barry Irwin, a prominent racehorse
owner and CEO of Team Valor International, testified to Congress
that states are in a constant competition with each other for top
horses with trainers lobbying for laxer drug rules. States that
appease these trainers get the horses. 34 These lobbying efforts, and
subsequent state appeasement, undermine any attempt at
uniform drug regulation; rather, they perpetuate a disjointed
system and expose state racing commissions to exploitation.
B. State -by-StateAnalysis
Currently, states are perpetually competing to acquire
more horses for their races.3 5 Some states have relaxed drug
regulations to do so; 3 6 others have not. This disjointed system has
led to trainers dosing horses differently in different states. 37 Two
states in particular illustrate this problem: Kentucky and New
York.
Kentucky has long been recognized as a leader in many
aspects of the thoroughbred horse racing industry, including drug
regulation. Kentucky has approved a ban that outlaws anabolic
steroids for horses in competition, but allows veterinarians to
administer three naturally occurring steroids for therapeutic
purposes. 38 Regarding the former, Kentucky has completely
banned the use of stanozolol. 3 9 Stanozolol, also marketed under the
trade name Winstrol is an anabolic steroid that is not naturally
occurring in horses and can be detected months after its
administration.40 Stanozolol, while used as a short-term stimulus
for a horse's appetite, can have powerful muscle-building effects if
used regularly. 4 1 According to Jerry Yon, the Chairman of
Kentucky's Equine Council, the state's ban of stanozolol is an
example of how Kentucky's rules are stricter than other statesmany of whom permit the use of the steroid. 42
34 Id. at 129.
35
Id.
36

I[d.

37

_/d.

Russolello, supranote 28.
Russolello, supra note 28.
40 Matt Hegarty, New York bans use ofanabolic steroidstanozolo DAILY RACING
38

39

FORUM

(Feb.

stanozolol.
41
42

Id.
Id.

29,

2016),

http://www.drf.com/news/new-york-bans-use-anabolic-steroid-
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Until recently, New York was one of the states allowing
4
restricted use of stanozolol. 3 Under New York's previous
regulation, stanozolol could appear in post-race samples at trace
levels, thus allowing for administration of the drug as long as it
44
was administered several months before the race. Following this
recent ban, the New York State Gaming Commission stated,
"There is no valid reason to administer [stanozololl to a healthy
racehorse, and there are better alternatives that are permitted for
45
horses that are sick and injured."
The differences in drug regulation between these states are
critical in the sport of thoroughbred horse racing. Both New York
46
and Kentucky host a leg of the Triple Crown. With both states
implementing different drug regulations, horses eligible to
compete in New York can still be in violation of Kentucky's steroid
policy. 47 That is, horses permitted to race in one jurisdiction, while
using a particular steroid, could fail to clear a drug test in another
48
jurisdiction while using that same steroid. Though this is only
one example, it clearly shows why congressional action to
formulate a uniform approach to drug regulation is necessary.
Despite the differences between Kentucky and New York,
two of the country's most popular horse racing states, eight other
states have committed to a uniform medication and drug testing
49
program: the Mid Atlantic Uniform Medication Program. The
Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association (THA) initiated the
agreement.50 The participating states include: New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West
1
Virginia, and Massachusetts. Duncan Patterson, the Chairman
of the Delaware Thoroughbred Racing Commission, stated that the
agreement demonstrates that the racing industry has the means
and wherewithal to join together to protect the integrity of the
52
industry and the welfare of the horses. This Program seemingly
4

Hegarty, supra note 43.

44

Id.

Id.
Russolello, supranote 28.
47 d.
48 1d.
49 Eight States Commit to Uniform Drug Rules, BLOOD HORSE (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/122491/eight-states-commit-to-uniform45
46

drug-rules.
5

Id
51Id.

5 2 d.
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underscores the desire by many state commissions to adopt a
national scheme for uniform drug regulation. It also, however,
underscores the necessity for Congressional action to do so, as
many state racing commissions have refused to participate. 53
II. THE NATIONAL APPROACH
A. Background
Prior to 1998, there was no coordinated effort to regulate
drug usage in any sport. 54 Rather, each sport had differing
definitions, policies, sanctions, and punishments for using drugs.5 5
Then, in 1998, the Tour de France cycling scandal demonstrated
the need for such regulation. In relevant part, that scandal led to
the creation of an independent international agency designed to
create universally accepted medication and drug-testing policies to
combat steroid usage in sports-the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA).6
WADA's mission led to the creation of the World AntiDoping Code, which aims "to advance the anti-doping effort
through universal harmonization of core anti-doping elements."5 7
The World Anti-Doping Code was adopted by all international
sports and governments in 2003. Under this approach, a country
must create an organization to enforce the WADA policy within its
borders for its athletes to participate in the Olympics. 58 In the
United States, the USADA enforces the WADA policy. 5 9
As the WADA signatory, the USADA collects samples from
athletes within the United States who seek to participate in the
Olympics.60 These samples are collected under procedures that
comply with the World Anti-Doping Code and WADA.61 Upon
collecting these samples, the USADA then conducts investigations

5,3 Id.

Wendt, supra note 6, at 178.
55 Id.
56 Id.
54

57

Id.

Matt Hegarty, USADA Under the Microscope, DAiLY RACING
F. (Aug. 9, 2015),
http://www.drf.com/news/usada-under-microscope [https://perma.cc/7TGV-LFLT].
59
d.
60 Id.
61 I[d.
58
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into potential violations and determines the penalties for any
62
infractions in accordance with WADA guidelines.
Although the Olympics includes three equestrian sports,
horse racing is not one of them. Thus, there is no requirement for
the horse racing industry to adopt the WADA approach. An
underlying funding issue may also be a contributing factor. From
2012 to 2015, the USADA's annual budget was approximately $14
million;63 an amount that is less than half of what state racing
commissions spent, approximately $30 million, on drug testing and
enforcement in 2014.64 Without any indication that the USADA's
budget would increase to account for the additional spending, a
funding deficiency would exist. This is an additional reason why
horse racing has not adopted WADA's approach.
B. PastEfforts
Beyond WADA's approach, there have been efforts to create
national standards for drug regulation within the sport. The 1978
Horse Racing Act marked the first instance of legislative oversight
of horse racing.6 5 Notably, though this Act provides the Federal
Trade Commission with oversight and enforcement powers in
horseracing, it fails to provide any meaningful approach -to the
regulation of drug usage. Several attempts, however, have been
made. 66
During the 1980s, after contemplating banning drugs in
horse racing,67 Congress ultimately decided to leave that decision
to individual states. 6 8 As a result, the thirty-eight separate state
racing commissions with thirty-eight different drug standards
were formed.69 Owners and organizations, however, are now
70
calling for Congress to reconsider its stance and intervene.
Arthur B. Hancock III, whose grandfather founded Claiborne
Farm, the storied former home of Secretariat and Seabiscuit,
stated, "I'm really hoping that we can get Congress's help because
62

I

63[d

64Ijd.
65 Wendt, supra note 6, at 177.
66 Id. at 184-185.
67 Wendt, supranote 6, at 179.
68Id.
69
Wendt, supranote 6, at 177.
70 Id. at 179.
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drugs have really hurt our sport .... One trainer uses drugs .. . and
another feels like he has to do it .... We owe it to these noble,

beautiful animals to do something."7 1
Chairman of The Jockey Club, Ogden lVills Phipps, has

been working with the state racing commissions to unify anti-drug
efforts. 72 Phipps has argued that if the major racing states
continue to refuse the implementation of drug reform, the Jockey
Club will seek rapid implementation of the Horseracing Integrity
and Safety Act of 2015.73 This bill would designate the United
States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) "as the independent antidoping organization with responsibility for ensuring the integrity
and safety of those horse races that are the subject of interstate
off-track wagers." 74 Representative Pitts, who introduced the bill,
said, "It's an industry that has, for years, pledged to clean things
up. ... But things seem to be getting worse, not better."7 5
III. THE THOROUGHBRED HORSERACING ACT OF 2015
A. Backgroundand Purposeof the Act
The most recent uniform approach, the Thoroughbred
Horseracing Act of 2015, has been proposed by Representatives
Andy Barr of Kentucky and Paul Tonko of New York.76 Much like
the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2015, the THA would
task the USADA with standardizing medication rules that
currently vary by state.7 7 Congress, however, made extensive
findings regarding the annual economic impact of horse racing on
the United States' economy.7 8 Most importantly, recall that
Congress determined that the industry accounts for nearly
$25,000,000,000 to the United States economy and that many
horses competed in more than one state. 79 Aside from these

71 Juliet Macur, Horse Racing Still Stumbhng
in Antidrug Push, N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/sports/horse-racing-still-stumbling-inpush-against-drugs.html [https://perma.cclX6SQ-KJ6S].

72 Wendt, supra note 6, at 179.
7

3Id.
7 Id.
7 5 [d.

Zalesin, supra note 10.
Id3
78 H.R. 3084, supra note 25.
79
Jd
76

7
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congressional findings, the legislation is similar to the previously
proposed Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2015.
B. DistinctLegislation or By-the -Wayside Effort?
This legislation and the Horseracing Integrity and Safety
Act of 2015 both task the USADA with the oversight powers to
80
a standardized

produce

set of national

medication

rules.

Accordingly, this legislation seems to be an extension of the WADA
approach, which also tasks the USADA with similar oversight
powers.
Such reliance, however, on the USADA will likely present
the same potential issues as those mentioned with the adoption of
the WADA approach. Specifically, recall that there has been no
indication that any increase in government funding would be
provided to the USADA to account for the additional expenses of
administering a national drug policy in the racing industry. This
lack of funding is one of the many reasons that stakeholders refuse
8
to seek a uniform drug policy. ' But, according to congressional
findings, the THA is distinguished by its financial impact on the
industry. 82
C Why the Legislation Will Likely Fail
The THA of 2015 will likely meet the same opposition as
past efforts to institute a national approach. Most opponents of the
proposed legislation point to the broad powers vested in the
USADA. 83 Most importantly, opponents assert that the USADA
lacks the required competency to oversee drug regulation in horse
racing. 4 Specifically, Ed Martin, the President of the ARCI,
expressed concerns that the USADA lacks veterinarian
involvement.8 5 This issue, however, should not cause the
legislation to fail; it could seemingly be resolved by authorizing
H.R. 3084 supra note 25; see also H.R. 2641, supra note 12.
ARCJ NHBPA Express Opposition to Proposed HorseracingIntegrity Act,
supra note 21.
82 H.R. 3084 supra note 25.
80
81

83

Zalesin, supra note 11.

Id.
ARCI
supra note 21.
84

85

NHBPA Express Opposition to Proposed Horseracing Integrity Act,
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another organization with veterinarian involvement to oversee
drug regulation in horse racing. In fact, though no such efforts
have been made, the proposed resolution would require nothing
more than a few strokes of a pen. Solutions, however, to the other
problems opponents provide for rejecting this and past reform
efforts are not so simple.
IV. OPPONENTS OF THE NATIONAL APPROACH
A. Backgroundand GeneralArguments
There are two primary not-so-simple arguments as to why
opponents believe a national approach is unneeded: (1) it would
unconstitutionally usurp states' rights; and (2) the sport of horse
racing is clean and such regulations are therefore not needed.8 6
Neither argument is persuasive.
B. States'RigltsIssue
Opponents argue that the implementation of the national
approach would violate states' rights and add an unneeded layer
of bureaucracy.87
I. Constitutionalanalysis
When confronted with states' rights issues, the Supreme
Court asks two threshold questions: (1) whether Congress has the
authority to act under the Constitution; and (2) if so, does the
congressional act infringe on state sovereignty under the loth
Amendment?88 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court held that the
United States had an implied power to create the Bank of the
United States under its Necessary and Proper Clause powers.8 9
Furthermore, the Court also determined that states lack the
power, by taxation or otherwise, to impede or control any of the
constitutional means employed by the United States to execute its
powers under the Constitution.90

8 Barker, supra note 14; see also Paulick, supra note 21.
8 Barker, supra note 14.

8 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 319-21 (1819).
8 Id. at 316.
90 Id.
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ii. Hypotheticalanalysis
Although McCulloch is factually distinct, its logic regarding
congressional authority to create a national bank demonstrates
that adopting a national approach to drug regulation in
thoroughbred racing would not violate states' rights. Recall the
first inquiry under McCulloch: does Congress have the authority
9
to act under the Constitution? 1 Here, Congress will likely not
violate states' rights by passing the THA of 2015.
Under the THA of 2015, Congress made findings to
demonstrate that the horse racing industry significantly impacts
92
the United States' economy. Because this economic influence is
provided in support of the proposed legislation, Congress has
implied action under their Commerce Clause powers.
C Commerce Clause Power

.

Congressional power under the Commerce Clause has
9
shifted throughout the history of the United States. 3 The
Commerce Clause provides Congress with "the power to . .
94
When
regulate commerce . . . among the several states."
determining whether Congress has the authority to act under the
Commerce Clause, the Court has consistently held that Congress
may regulate the: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2)
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things,
although the threat posed may come only from intrastate
activities; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate
95

commerce.
When analyzing Congress' ability to act under the
Commerce Clause, the Court typically looks the at three factors
announced in United States v. Lopez: (1) the economic activity
being regulated; (2) the jurisdictional language that limits such

9' Id. at 319.
92

H.R. 3084, supra note 25.

9: David Forte, Commerce, Commerce, Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of the
2011),
18,
(Jan.
FoUNDATION
HERITAGE
THE
Clause,
Commerce
-

20
11/0 1/commerce-commerce -everywhere-the
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
-clause.
uses-and-abuses-ofthe -commerce
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
95 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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regulation; and (3) legislative findings that tend to show an effect
on interstate commerce. 96 The Lopez factors, though not
dispositive in every case, generally indicate the constitutionality of
congressional action under the Commerce Clause.
For example, in United States v. Lopez, the Court
determined that Congress did not have the authority to pass the
Gun Free School Zones Act under its Commerce Clause power
because the Act effectively allowed Congress to regulate purely
local activity, thus infringing upon the states' police powers.9 7
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, the Violence Against
Women Act was declared unconstitutional under Congress'
Commerce Clause powers because Congress not only failed to show
any link between the legislation and economic activity, but also
failed to provide limiting jurisdictional language. 98
Alternatively, the THA should constitute a constitutional
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers; Congress should
be able to establish the necessary link between the THA and
economic activity. When proposing the THA, congressional
findings demonstrated that the racing industry contributes
significantly to the United States economy annuallyapproximately $25,000,000,000.99 This, in addition to the same
horses often competing in different states, clearly implicates
Congress' Commerce Clause power as Congress is seeking to
regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.1 00
The Lopez factors further demonstrate Congress' ability to
act under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, recall that the
legislative findings show that the horse racing industry has an
expansive effect on interstate commerce.10 1 Beyond these
legislative findings, the text of the THA provides for the
establishment of "the Thoroughbred Horseracing Anti-Doping
Authority as an independent organization with responsibility for
developing and administering an anti-doping program for
thoroughbred horses. . . and horseraces . .. that are the subject of
interstate off-track wagers."1 02
Id. at 560-63.
Id. at 567-68.
98 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
9 H.R. 3084, supra note 25.
00 Lopez at 560-63.
101 H.R. 3084, supranote 25.
9
9

102

Id.
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The specific language of this legislation is important
because it limits the scope of the proposed legislation to
"horseraces . . . that are the subject of interstate off-track

wagers." 103 This language reflects that Congress has pinpointed
the precise economic activity being regulated, the jurisdictional
scope of that regulation, and the impact of the horse racing
industry on the national economy. Accordingly, this legislation
10 4
complies with the Lopez factors.
D. Tenth Amendment Implcations
Though the THA would be a constitutional exercise of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, McCulloch
further instructs that the law may need to be examined for Tenth
Amendment violations.1 0 5 That is, it must be determined whether
the THA infringes state sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment
provides that, "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
10 6 Although the
the States respectively, or to the people."
Constitution does not specifically provide that Congress may
regulate the horse racing industry, it does provide that Congress
107
may regulate commerce.
Here, unlike Lopez, Congress would not be violating the
states' police powers by passing a uniform approach to combat
10 The states are implicitly granted
steroid usage in horse racing.
the power to establish and enforce laws protecting the welfare,
1 09 But these police powers do not
safety, and health of the public.
include the regulation of steroid usage in thoroughbred racing.
Therefore, Congress could likely pass the THA under the authority
of the Commerce Clause and would not infringe upon states' rights.

103 Id.
104

Lopez at 560-63.

States v.
105 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
100 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10 Lopez at 567-68.
Law
Plain-English
109
Nolo's

Pohce Powers, NOLO,
Dictionary,
(last visited Aug. 19, 2017)

http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/police-powers-term.html
[https://perma.cc/27XF-L7Z5].
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E. Outlook
Although the THA could pass constitutional muster, the
legislation is still likely to fail due to the lobbying efforts of the
state regimes. In addition to the reasons that this legislation will
likely fail, the proposed legislation could arguably be in violation
of the Tenth Amendment for reasons that will be elucidated in
Section VI.
V. AMENDING THE 1978 HORSE RACING ACT
In 1978, Congress exercised federal control over the horse
racing industry when it passed the Interstate Horse Racing Act of
1978.110 The 1978 Horse Racing Act provides that "the States
should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms
of gambling may legally take place within their borders.""'
Congress did, however, provide that the purpose of the 1978 Horse
Racing Act was to regulate interstate commerce with respect to
wagering on horse racing.1 12 Although this legislation is limited to
wagering on horse racing, the result was the institution of the
thirty-eight racing commissions that maintain individual
regulatory authority. 1 3

A. Implicationsof the 1978 Horse Racing Act
Due to a lack of federal regulation regarding steroid usage
in thoroughbred racing, states have taken it upon themselves to do
so as evidenced by the thirty-eight state racing commissions. 114
Accordingly, opponents of federal regulation could likely argue
that federal regulation at this point would usurp states' rights
because Congress implicitly authorized states to regulate steroid
usage in horse racing by failing to act; thus, reserving this right to
the states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment.

o10
Cassidy, supra note 34, at 127.
1 Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.

112

113

Id

y

Cassidy, supra note 34, at 127.

114 Id.

§ 3001

(1978).
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Assuming that such a failure to act would reserve this right
to the states, the question then becomes whether Congress could
eventually act to take back such powers. Fortunately, the dormant
Commerce Clause is likely implicated in this situation, thus
enabling Congress to act to amend the Interstate Horse Racing Act
of 1978 to include regulation of steroid usage in horse racing.
B. Dormant Commerce ClausePower
In relevant part, the Commerce Clause provides Congress
11 5
with the power to regulate commerce among the several states.
As an expansion of this power, the Supreme Court has implicitly
created a prohibition on states from creating legislation that
116 This prohibition
discriminates against interstate commerce.
prevents a state from prohibiting, restricting, or discriminating
7
against products from other states." As an illustration, Michigan,
for example, could not enact legislation prohibiting the
11 8
importation of buckeyes from Ohio. Despite this prohibition, the
current state-by-state patchwork of drug regulations seemingly do
just that; due to conflicting drug laws, it disallows certain out-ofstate horses from racing in Kentucky that have ingested steroids,
or other drugs, that Kentucky prohibits.
The prohibition provided by the dormant Commerce Clause
rests upon arguments that the Constitution vests Congress with
119 The
exclusive dominion over the regulation of commerce.
dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about "economic
protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 1in20
state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."
State regulatory measures that expressly mandate such
differential treatment, and consequently run afoul of the dormant
Commerce Clause, have typically been struck down by most
courts. 12 1 These laws are considered facially discriminatory, and

courts subject them to strict scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny not
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Timothy J. Slattery, The Dormant Commerce Clause: Adopting a New
Standardand a Return to Principle, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1243, 1250-51 (2009).
117 Id. at 1251.
118 Id,
119Id.
20
1 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
121 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
i1
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only requires a state to demonstrate that the law has a nonprotectionist purpose but also that there is no less discriminatory
means for achieving that purpose.

122

As an example of this, the dormant Commerce Clause was
triggered when a state's regulatory scheme permitted in-state
wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricted the
ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In response, the Court
reaffirmed its prior holdings in stating that "states may not enact
laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give
a competitive advantage to in-state business." 23 These concerns
are equally apparent in horse racing. States that have adopted less
stringent drug regulations in horse racing to attract more horses
and increase state revenues, would likely violate the dormant
Commerce Clause because such regulations would give a
"competitive advantage" to those states with less stringent
drug
regulations.

124

Under dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, courts
will also apply strict scrutiny if a law controls commerce that
occurs wholly outside of the state. 125 Specifically, courts look at
whether the statute controlling conduct in another state
potentially gives rise to inconsistent legislation being applied to
the same activity. 126 In another example, the Supreme Court has
held that a law requiring out-of-state beer shippers to affirm that
their posted prices were no higher than the prices in bordering
states was unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court reasoned that the statute effectively enabled one state
to control commercial activity occurring wholly outside the
boundary of that state. 127 In horse racing, enabling one state to
permit certain drugs that another state does not, like the use of
stanozolol in New York and Kentucky, effectively enables the
stricter state to control the commercial activity of the more lenient
state by preventing horses from competing in both states.1 28

122
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https://statepowerproject.org/dormant-commerce-clause/#_ftn2 (last visited Sept. 1, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/JHM6-XNYV].
123 Granholm at 472.
24 Cassidy, supra note 34, at 129.
125 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324,
336-37 (1989).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 338, 339.
128 Russolello, supra note 28 [https://perma.cc/TM37-PB8K].
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Opponents could argue that the state regulations in the
horse racing industry are not subject to the dormant Commerce
129
Clause under the market participant exception. This exception
to the Commerce Clause's scrutiny is triggered when the state
functions as a market participant rather than a market a
regulator.13 0 The Supreme Court upheld a Maryland program that
paid haulers to remove abandoned cars from streets, making it
more difficult for out-of-state haulers to participate under this
13
market participant exception. 1 Likewise, the Court also upheld a
South Dakota policy that restricted out-of-state sales by a state132
owned cement factory during times of shortage.
However, the thirty-eight states that have adopted
independent drug regulations for thoroughbred racing are not
acting as market participants in the horse racing industry; rather,
each state is operating as a regulator for a national horse racing
industry. Specifically, each of the separate racing commissions is
effectively using their coercive powers to establish different or
more lenient drug policies to dictate the ways in which other states
interact in the racing industry. Because the aforementioned state
drug regulations likely violate the dormant Commerce Clause,
Congress must act to provide a uniform approach to combat steroid
usage in thoroughbred racing because of the impact horse racing
has on the national economy.
C CongressionalPower to Regulate
Based upon the economic impact of the racing industry on
the United States, Congress' Commerce Clause powers, and the
implications of the 1978 Horse Racing Act, Congress has the power
and, likely, the duty to establish a national approach to drug
regulation in thoroughbred racing. Recall that the 1978 Horse
Racing Act provides Congress with the ability to regulate
33 Furthermore,
interstate off-track wagers of horse racing.1
Congress has made extensive findings regarding the economic
129
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State Power Project, supra note 133 [https://perma.cc/JHM6-XNYV].
Legal Information Institute, Market Participant Exception, CORNELL
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[https://perma.cc/29N2-65BB.
131 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 813-14 (1976).
132 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, et al., 447 U.S. 429, 445 (1980).
133 Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3001.
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impact of horse racing on the national economy; importantly,
interstate off-track wagers are one of the leading contributions to
this economic impact. 134
However, this lack of a national drug regime in
thoroughbred racing is striking at the core of the 1978 Horse
Racing Act. Specifically, the 1978 Horse Racing Act provides that
the federal government should ensure state cooperation for
interstate wagering purposes. 135 However, the differences amongst
the states' drug policies are negatively impacting such wagers by
enabling horses to compete in some states but not others for drug
violations; a uniform approach would undoubtedly resolve this
issue. By instituting an amendment to the 1978 Horse Racing Act,
Congress could resolve this issue succinctly. Such an amendment
could require that each state must comport with a national drug
policy of prescribed drugs or could provide for a governing body,
like the USADA, to oversee the standardization of drug policies in
the industry.
CONCLUSION
Thoroughbred horse racing, like any other sport, is
premised on the idea that each competing horse should be equal.1 36
And, of course, some horses are more gifted than others. Steroid
abuse in horse racing, however, has created an arena that enables
humans to control another aspect of life by building the most elite
horse. Aside from this human element that has become
commonplace in the industry, the current state-by-state
framework encourages such behaviors by allowing less stringent
drug policies to attract the best horses.
Congress must act to discourage this behavior. Although
horses will continue to need the use of some drugs to combat
disease and other illness, a uniform approach must be adopted to
prevent this sport from becoming just another aspect of human
dominion. Without congressional regulation, the sport of horse
racing will likely continue to become more fragmented, resulting
in a once illustrious sport becoming an object of nostalgia.
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